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BAR BRIEFS
ATTORNEYS WANTED
The Board of Legal Examiners of the Civil Service Commis-
sion, headed by Solicitor General, Charles Fahy, has announced
an examination for the establishment of its first register of eligi-
bles for appointment to the first 4 grades of the Federal legal
service. The written portion of the examination will be given
April 11th, 1942. Applications to take the examination must be
filed with the Civil Service Commission in Washington not later
than March 3rd, 1942. Forms may be obtained from any of the
Commission's offices.
EXEMPTION OF LIFE INSURANCE MONEY FROM
CREDITORS IN NORTH DAKOTA
1. INSURANCE: EXEMPTIONS BY STATUTE
From a study of the life insurance law of North Dakota it is
evident that our legislature from time to time has passed insur-
ance laws for the benefit of the poor within its borders. Our
Supreme Court has construed those statutes liberally in order to
give full effect to this legislative policy.'
The North Dakota statutes on life insurance benefit pay-
ments are Compiled Laws of North Dakota 1913, sec. 8719' as
amended by North Dakota. Laws 1927, c. 225, and N. D. Laws
1929, c. 149.'
11. PROBLEMS ARISING UNDER BENEFIT PAYMENTS
A. When Made Payable To The Insured Himself.
The Legislature in the 1929 Laws, supra, by the use of the
words "deceased" and "insured" has filled in the "loophole," so-
to-speak, which was found to appear in section 8719 by the case
of Cohen vs. Gordon Ferguson, 56 N. D. 545, 218 N. W. 209
(1928). Our Supreme Court has construed the 1929 Laws, supra,
'The policy of construction by our court is clearly expressed in the case
of Jorgensen vs. DeViney, 57 N. D. 63, at 73, 222 N. W. 464 (1928). "The great
object of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the inten-
tion of -the lawmakers as expressed in the law."
'N. D. Compiled Laws 1913, sec. 8719. "The avails of a life insurance
policy or of a contract payable by any mutual aid or benevolent society,
when made payable to the personal representative of a deceased, his heirs
or estate upon the death of a member of such society or of such insured shall
not be subject to the debts of the decedent except by special contract, but
shall be inventoried and distributed to the heirs or the heirs at law of such
decedent. .."
N. D. Laws 1929, c. 149. "The avails of a life insurance policy or of a
contract payable by any mutual aid or benevolent society, when made pay-
able to the deceased, the personal representatives of the deceased, his heirs
or estate. . ." The Chapter is concluded as follows: "This statute is intended
to apply only to life insurance policies and beneficiary certificates that by
their terms are made payable to the insured, to the personal representatives
of the insured, or to his heirs or estate."
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and said that a policy payable to the insured himself comes under
the protection of the law.'
B. Are Benefit Payments Subject to Beneficiary's Debts?
There has been no case that has come to the writer's knowl-
edge in this state which determines what may be done with the
money once it is paid over to the beneficiary, as far as the bene-
ficiary's debts are concerned.' There are two lines of authority
upon the question, according to Ruling Case Law.'a In many jur-
isdictions it is the rule that a statute which exempts the proceeds
of insurance from the debts of the insured in no way affects the
liability of the fund for the debts of the beneficiary. Leading
states cited for this holding are the states of Michigan and
Washington. But many states hold that such proceeds are ex-
empt from the claims of the beneficiary's creditors, including the
states of California, Nebraska, and Minnesota. For valuable
notes see 6 A. L. R. 603, 610.
C. Exemption Under The Bankruptcy Law.
Section 70a (5) of the Chandler Act' vests the policy of in-
surance in the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy upon the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. Under this section the holder of
the policy must pay to the trustee in bankruptcy the cash sur-
render value within thirty days after it has been ascertained from
the insurance company. However, section 6 of the Chandler Act'
says that the provisions of this Act will not affect the allowance
to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the laws
of the United States or by the state laws in force at the time of
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. We have a statute which
'In Anderson vs. Northern and Dakota Trust Co., 65 N. D. 721, 725, 261 N.
759 (1935) Judge Nuessle in construing sec. 8719, cited supra note 2, and com-
menting on the case of Cohen vs. Gordon Ferguson, 56 N. D. 545, 218 N. W.
209 (1928), said: "The opinion in the case of Cohen vs. Ferguson was filed
In January, 1928. The question there was as to whether a policy payable to
the insured himself fell within the terms of §8719. We held that it did not.
So it seems clear that when the statute was reenacted as chapter 149 the
reason for this reenactment was to widen its provisions so as to include
policies payable to the insured; to make the statute cover not only policies
written prior to the enactment of Chapter 225, Sess. Laws 1937, but also poli-
cies thereafter written; and to strictly define the limits within whrch the
statute operated."
5§5078, 1913 Comp. Laws, protects insurance proceeds flowing from Fra-
ternal Benefit Societies even in the hands of a beneficiary. See note 15 infra.
5all R. C. L. 528.
'Chandler Act, 1938, sec. 70a (5), 11 U. S. C. A. 1110. ". . .And provided
further, That when any bankrupt, who is a natural person, shall have any in-
surance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself, his
estate, or personal representatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash
surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the com-
pany issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained
and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the
claims of the creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under
the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as
asset. .. "
'Chandler Act, 1938, sec. 6, 11 U. S. C. A. 124. "This title shall not effect
the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the
laws of the United States or by the State Laws in force at the time of the
filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile for
the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, or for a
longer portion of such six months than in any other State...
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apparently serves the purpose for what the Chandler Act calls
"exemptions."'
The case of In Re Coughlin' appears to be the only case in
this state which deals with the exemption problem under section
8718a, and in its opinion the court used the term "exempt" quite
freely. However, the court did not say that section 8718a is an
exemption statute. Our Constitution provides that an exemption
statute must be limited in amount."
D. When Payable To A Specific Beneficiary With Change of
Beneficiary Reserved.
The next consideration is whether an insurance contract
which is payable to a specific beneficiary with the right reserved
in the insured to change the beneficiary at will comes under the
provisions of the law. There is no doubt that a policy payable
to a specific beneficiary with no right reserved to change the
beneficiary at will, vests immediately in the beneficiary, and the
money becomes part of the beneficiary's estate, if he dies before
the insured.
The case of Cohen vs. Gordon Ferguson, 56 N. D. 545, 218
N. W. 209 (1928) said that sec. 8719 does not apply to all insur-
ance contracts. This section covers only those contracts where
the insured, by the use of appropriate terms in the designation
of beneficiaries, has indicated an intention that the policy shall
be controlled by it. But sec. 8718a saves the policy from credi-
tors in any event, and upon death the beneficiary gets the pro-
ceeds by contract.
E. Does The Insurance Money At Any Time Become Part
of the General Assets of the Insured's Estate?
The cases in this state hold that creditors of the insured can-
not attach the money in the hands of the executor or administra-
tor of the insured on the theory that the insurance money has be-
come part of the general assets of the estate. The decisions hold
ON. D. Supp. 1925, sec. 8718a. "The surrender value of any policy of life
insurance, which policy of insurance would, upon the death of the insured,
be payable to the wife or children or any relative of the insured dependent
or liable to be dependent upon him for support, shall be absolutely exempt
from the claims of creditors of the insured, and no creditor and no court or
officer of a court acting for the creditors of such insured shall have the right
under any circumstances to elect for the insured to have such policy of in-
surance surrender or in anywise converted into money; and no such policy
of life insurance and no property right therein belonging to the holder and
no value thereof shall, under any circumstances, be subject to seizure under
any process of any court."
'In Re Coughlin's Estate, 53 N. D. 188, 195, 205 N. W. 14 (1925). Judge
Nuessle said: "In view of the legislative intent expressed in the sections of
the statute quoted, supra, they are exempt from payment of debts of the
insured. Under these statutes, they are for the benefit of, and belong to,
the beneficiaries under the policy, or the heirs of the insured."
IN. D. Const. sec. 208. "The right of the debtor -to enjoy the com-
forts and necessaries of life shall be recognized by who!esome laws, exempt-
ing from forced sale to all heads of famies a homestead, the value of which
shall be limited and defined by law, and a reasonable amount of personal
property; the kind and value shall be fixed by law ..
"Supra, note 8.
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that a policy payable to the estate, personal representative, heir,
or assigns of the insured, is deemed to be payable to the heirs of
the insured, and that they take by contract and not by descent.'
Hence the money vests in the beneficiary as soon as it becomes
payable.
III. AMOUNT "EXEMPT" UNDER OUR LAWS.
The problem here is concerned with what amount may a per-
son invest in life insurance in North Dakota and still be under
protection of our "exemption" statutes.
N. D. Compiled Laws, 1913 sec. 8719, supra, was held con-
stitutional by our court." The court said that it was not an ex-
emption statute. Hence no amount need be stated in the statute
which will be the limit of investment in one year under the law.
The amendments to sec. 8719 were likewise held not to be exemp-
tion laws." The court said that if. the legislature had intended
to abrogate the rule thus established, it could have done so in
unmistakable, apt words. The court ruled out the dicta in Marif-
jeren vs. Farup, 51 N. D. 78, 8i, 199 N. W. 181, 182 (1924) which
implied that sec. 8719 was an exemption statute.
In the state of New York, they have recognized those laws
as exemption laws and have set a limit of five hundred dollars a
year which an insolvent debtor may pay into insurance premiums
which are absolutely exempt. Indeed, our Supreme Court has
discussed the problem of limitation of investments under our
statutes. In the Smith case, cited in footnote 13, Judge Robin-
son said in his dissenting opinion, "I dissent on the grounds that
section 8719, Compiled Laws, is in reality an exemption statute
which does not limit the exemption to a reasonable amount or to
any amount or to any sum. It permits a party to put all of his
property beyond the reach of creditors, and the constitutionality
of an act is to be determined by what may be done under it."
The matter of amount which may be put beyond the reach
of creditors was discussed once more in connection with another
code section." The statute was held constitutional by the case
of Brown vs. Steckler, 40 N. D. 113, 168 N. W. 670, 1 A. L. R. 753
(1918). The case held among other things that the court took
judicial notice of the fact that payments under a mutual protec-
tion plan were relatively small. The court went on to say, "This
"Talcott vs. Bailey, 54 N. D. 19, 208 N. W. 549 (1926), followedI Finn vs.
Walsh, 19 N. D. 61, 121 N. W. 766 (1909); Farmers State Bank vs. Smith, 36
N. D. 225, 162 N. W. 302 (1917); and Marifjeren vs. Farup, 51 N. D. 78, 199
N. W. 181 (1924) to bring about that result.
"Farmers State Bank vs. Smith, 36 N. W. 225, 162 N. W. 302 (1917).
"Anderson vs. Northern and Dakota Trust Co., 65 N. D. 721, 261 N. W.
759 (1935).
"N. D. Comp. Laws 1913, sec. 5053. "The money or benefit, charity, relief
or aid to be paid, provided or rendered by any association authorized to do
business under this article shall not be liable to attachment by trustee, gar-
nishee or other process, and shall not be seized1, taken, appropriated or ap-
plied by any legal or equitable process, or by operation of law, to pay any
debt or liability of a certificate holder, or of any beneficiary named In a
certificate, or any person who may have any right thereunder."
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is not like the old line legal reserve insurance companies. There
the amount is much larger and may be invested in for a business
venture." The maximum limit which may be invested in life in-
surance policies by an insolvent person has not been fixed by
statute in this state.
Quaere: Are we to understand that any amount whatever
may be invested in life insurance in North Dakota, and still be
free from payment of the debts of the insured? Is Sec. 8718a an
exemption statute? If so, is it constitutional? If it is not an ex-
emption statute, just what is an exemption statute in North
Dakota? Does sound policy dictate the necessity for an amend-
ment which, while setting up an ample insurance estate for the
family, will prevent investing large sums in exempt insurance?
RAYMOND R. RUUD
Law School.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In George Anderson, Pltf. and Applt., vs. Emma M. Roberts, et al., Defts.,
and Victor Moynier, Deft. and Respt.
That after a certificate of tax sale has been issued, the validity thereof
may not be challenged with respect to any of the tax proceedings prior
thereto unless those defects are such as may be urged under the provisions
of Section 2193, Comp. Laws N. D. 1913, or are beyond the power .of the
legislature to remedy.
That the description of land assessed in the name of the owner thereof
and described as: NW%, S. 14, T. 139, R. 79. Ac. 160, is sufficient to support
a tax levy and subsequent proceedings resulting in a tax sale.
That where land sold as one tract at tax sale is contained in a legal sub-
division of 160 acres belonging to one owner and is occupied as a unit, such
sale is valid as against the contention that the land should have been adver-
tised and sold in smaller subdivisions.
That Chapter 235, Session Laws N. D. 1939, requires the publication of
a notice of expiration of redemption and the service thereof by registered
mail on the record title owner, the person in possession and mortgagee, lien
holders and other persons interested in the property as may appear from
the records of the register of deeds and clerk of the district court of the
county wherein the property involved is situated.
That under Chapter 235, Session Laws N. D. 1939, a county does not
acquire title to real property under tax deed proceedings until the prescribed
notice of expiration of redemption has been published and served upon all
parties entitled to redeem in the manner prescribed by the statute.
That until statutory notice of expiration of redemption has been published
and served upon all parties entitled to receive such notice, and the prescribed
period of redemption has expired, the right of redemption remains as to all.
That where two separate tax sales are held for taxes levied upon the
same property for the same year, one being for general taxes and the other
for hail taxes and separate certificates are issued therefor as prescribed by
law, there exist separate rights of redemption from each sale and a notice of
redemption that fails to disclose the separate sales, certificates and respec-
tive amounts for which the property was sold, is an insufficient notice and is
not effective to terminate rights of redemption.
(Syllabus by the Court)
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. Fred Jansonius,
Judge. AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
Christianson, J. concurring specially.
